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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
RUTH ELIZABETH HOLT CRAVEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
7446

KENNETH D. CRAVEN,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In his brief, appellant attacks the respondent's petition
for modification. This he has set out in full at pages 2, 3,
and 4 of his brief. He also attacks the adequacy of the
evidence to support certain of the Findings of Fact, the
Conclusions of Law, and the Order of Modification. He
has set out the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
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Order of Modification in full on pages 4, 5, 6, and 7 of his
brief. He has detail~d certain of the facts on pages 7, 8,
9, and 10 of his brief.
Respondent feels that it is necessary to detail the key
facts for the court. Respondent contends these show considerable changes in the circumstances governing the
amount of support money to be allowed. According to
Finding of Fact No. 11 in the Findings in the original
divorce matter herein, at the time the divorce was granted,
appellant was unemployed. Appellant claims that the record (at Tr. 28, 29) shows that there is no change in circumstances between the time of the original divorce decree and
the time of the trial of this matter. However, according to
the respondent's testimony upon cross examination upon
which appellant relies (i. e. at Tr. 28) respondent refused
to admit that there was no change in the circumstances of
appellant's employment between the time of the original
decree and the date of the modification hearing.
At the time of the divorce the appellant was still paying for his home (Tr. 86), whereas it is now paid for (Tr.
85) . Furthermore the testimony shows that appellant's ·
elder son is now 21 years old (Tr. 82), whereas he had
obviously been in his minority at time of the decree.
The testimony as to the appellant's income during the
7.8 month period preceeding the hearing on the petition for
modification was not $212.50 per month as contended by
the appellant, but was actually between $283.00 and $380.00
per month. This appears, from an examination of respond·
ent's Exhibit "A", which was appellant's checking account

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,]

~~~

r
j.

t

I

3
...

,_

record, as explained by the cross examination of the appellant (Tr. 81, 82, 83).
It further appeared that,nothing had been withdrawn
from_appellant's savings account since May 28, 1948 (Tr.
10) which would indicate the adequacy of appellant's income for his own support since that date.

In his statement of Facts, appellant claims that the
child was not of school age at the time of the hearing, however, the testimony was that respondent expected to enter
the child in .school in the near future (Tr. 22). When resj,ondent's testimony as to what it cost her per month for
the care of the child is added up, it appears she must spend
approximately $86.74 a month for the care of the child (Tr.
21 through 27), which is considerably more than she spent
for the care of the child at the time of the original divorce
decree, i.e. $25.00 per month (Tr. 17 and 40). A summary
of her testimony on this point shows the following:
Food and tending (Tr. 21) per month ...... $30.00
Clothing (Tr. 21), last 6 months ... $93.65
next 6 months . . . 84.60
Minimum average per month .............. 14.10
Medical and dental care ( Tr. 24)
Past 6 months .. $146.00
Average per month . . . . . . 24.33
Insurance (Tr. 25) per month . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.40
Toys (Tr. 26) per year, $80.00-per month . . 6.66
Amusement (Tr. 27) per month . . . . . . . . . . . 5.00
Haircuts and medicines (Tr. 27) . . . . . . . . . . 3.25
Total ............................... $86.74
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m

The child was 15 months old and still a babe in arms
w
at the time of the divorce decree (Tr. 14, 16) but was 5
years 8 months old at the time Trial Court entered its ' )t
f!
decision herein.

J

Evidence that an inflation had occurred in the price
of items needed for children was offered in detail by Mr.
Taylor (Tr. 44, 45, and 46) and Mr. Pace (Tr. 37 through
65).
No proof was offered at any time tending in any way to
show that appellant was unable to pay the increased award
ordered by the trial court.
'\

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law anL;
der
of Modification have been set out in full by the a1 ilant
on pages 4, 5, 6, 7, of his brief. These Findings
wen
supported by the evidence, and conclusions basr. upon
them to the effect 'that an increase should be made· in the
support money allowance, and the order based ther~on, are
well supported by, and in complete harmony with, the law.

li

ARGUMENT
1. THE RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION ALLEGED THREE IMPORTANT MATERIAL CHANGES IN CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING A
MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE; NAMELY, THE
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CHANGE IN AGE AND THE GROWTH OF THE CHILD,
THE GENERAL INFLATION IN PRICES OF ITEMS
NECESSARY FOR THE CHILD, AND LASTLY THE
FACT THAT THE APPELLANT WAS EMPLOYED AT
THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION.
Respondent alleged (in Par. 5 of her Petition) that
since the decree of divorce was issued, the child of the
parties had grown from infancy (fifteen months) to the
age of five years and four months, with the result that he
required much more food, clothing and medical care;
furthermc-woe, that since the date of the decree there had
been a gr at increase in the price of food, clothing, housing
accomm(uations and all other items necessary for the proper
care ar. support of the infant; that in consequence, Respon
:now needs $50.00 per month to care for the child
(P:
of Respondent's Petition).
1

f·

epondent further alleged (in Par. 4 of her Petition)
that _ . ;)ellant is now gainfully employed, which contrasts
with ~ . ,ging of fact number 11 of the original divorce proceedings.
This question has been dealt with by the Court in numerous previous cases. The authority to modify a divorce
decree is contained in Section 40-3-5 U. C. A. 1943 as follows:
"Disposition of Property and Children.
"When a decree of divorce is made the court
may make such orders in relation to the children,
property and parties, and the maintenance of the
parties and children, as may be equitable; provided,
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that if any of the children have attained the age of
ten years and are of sound mind, such children shall
have the privilege of selecting the parent to which '·
they will attach themselves. Such spbsequent j:'
changes or new orders may be made by the court :i
with respect to the disposal of the children or the distribution of property as shall be reasonable and
j.:
proper."
The rule as to pleading has been stated as follows in
Cody vs. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154 P. 952:
"* * * where material new conditions have
arisen after the decrees were made, which conditions
were not, and could not have been, considered or
passed on by the courts, then, upon proper application and proof, the courts may make 'subsequent
changes or new orders' respecting the allowance of
alimony or the distribution of property or the disposal of children."
And in Buzzo vs. Buzzo, 45 Utah 1621, 148 P. 362:
"* * * under statutes like ours, the courts
upon the application of either party have the power
to change, modify, or revise such a decree, and whenever it is satisfactorily made to appear that the circumstances and conditions of the parties, or one of
them*, have changed so that the amount originally
allowed is no longer just or equitable, the court may
modify the same." (*Italics ours.)
Appellant contends that respondent's petition does not
meet the requirements of this rule. He cites numerous cases
in support of this contention.
We contend that the cases denying modification are
clearly distinguishable.
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7
In Hamilton vs. Hamilton, 89 Utah 554, 58 P. (2d) 11,
~~ the court denied modification because the petition had no
~:~ other basis than that the husband had failed to make certain
' specified payments under a property settlement agreement.
e~

In Chaffee vs. Chaffee, 34 Utah 261, 225 P. 76, modification was denied because the defendant had alleged as the
only basis therefore, salary changes and health impairments
which had occurred before the granting of the original decree.

In Rockwood vs. Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 236 P. 457,
modification was denied where the husband's only allegation of change was that the wife had remarried. The court
(_:: pointed out that this did not of itself shift the burden of
support to the wife or new husband.
~

In Gardner vs. Gardner, 111 Utah 286, 177 P. (2d) 743,
modification was sought by the husband in relation to the
custody. The District Court increased the support money.
The Supreme Court reversed this, since there were no allegations at all in relation to the sufficiency of the original
award.
In Jones vs. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P. (2d) 222, a
decree by the District Court was reversed where it was alleged that additional sums were needed for a child, and the
District Court awarded an increase in alimony to the wife.
In Barraclough vs. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196, 111 P.
(2d) 792, modification was sought on the grounds that the
stipulation of the petitioner as to alimony amount was based
on duress. The Supreme Court pointed out there was no
allegation of change here.
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In Osmus vs. Osmus, 198 P. (2d) 233, modification
was denied where all changes alleged had occurred before
the granting of the original decree. ·
On the other hand, modification has been allowed in
the following Utah cases:
In Hampton vs. Hampton, 86 Utah 570, 47 P. (2d) 419,
a very substantial change in income was involved and modification was allowed.
In Hendricks vs. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P. (2d)
277, the price of wheat, upon which defendant's income depended, had fallen from $1.10 a bushel to $.26 a bushel and
modification was allowed.
In Carson vs. Carson, 87 Utah 1, 47 P. (2d) 894, it was
alleged a serious impairment of defendant's health had occurred since the granting of the original decree and that he
needed funds for medical and surgical care, and hospitalization, and that modification was essential.
The case, almost entirely like the present case, is
Sandall vs. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 Pac. 1093.
In this case a final decr·ee of divorce was entered for
the plaintiff (the wife) against the defendant on July 28,
1910. The decree also awarded the plaintiff the custody of
their minor child, at that time about two years of age. On
September 26t 1919, the plaintiff filed her petition for a
modification of the decree, in substance alleging the granting of the divorce and the award to plaintiff of custody of
the child. The petition then alleged that the decree of divorce was granted on the ground of failure of the defend·
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::,:::_ ant to provide plaintiff and the child with the common
necessaries of life, and also on the ground of defendant's
drunkenness and profligacy. The petition then alleged that
at the time of the hearing in the divorce proceedings, and
for a long time prior thereto, the defendant had been addicted to the use of liquor to the extent that he could not,
and did not, work sufficiently to provide plaintiff and her
minor child with the common necessaries of life; that the
reason she did not insist at the trial of the divorce proceedings on an allowance for support and maintenance of the
minor child was owing to defendant's habit and his lack of
ability to occupy a position of responsibility. Plaintiff
further alleged that owing to the growth of the child and
the high cost of living and the increased cost of clothing, it
had become practically impossible for the plaintiff to pro'"''- vide the child with the necessaries of life and that within
the last three or four years defendant had improved his
habits to such an extent that he was now able to contribute
to the support and maintenance of the child; that defendant
was earning upwards of $200.00 a month and had inherited
certain property which made it then possible for him to
make a proper allowance for the child's support, and that
$40.00 per month would be a reasonable sum for that purpose.

.-.

-·

The relief sought was granted, and defendant appealed
on the ground (among others) that the petition for modification of the decree did not state facts sufficient to entitle
the plaintiff to relief. The Court held that the petition did
state grounds for relief. T~e Court stated at Page 156 :
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"* * * It is sufficient to say the petition
seems to state all the elements necessary to sustain
the order of the Court. It refers to the divorce without alimony and reasons therefor, it recites the
changed condition of plaintiff and her child and also
the changed condition of the defendant in respect to
his ability to support the child."
It thus appears that where circumstances similar to
these alleged in respondent's petition have been dealt with
by this court in the past modification has been granted.

2. AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED AT THE
TRIAL TO WARRANT THE COURT'S ORDER OF
MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE: TO-WIT: THAT
DUE TO THE INCREASE IN THE CHILD'S AGE AND
ACTIVITIES, THE EXPENSE OF CARING FOR THE
CHILD HAD GREATLY INCREASED; THAT THE
CHILD WAS APPROACHING SCHOOL AGE, WHICH
FURTHER INCREASED THE COST OF CARING FOR
THE CHILD; THAT THERE HAD BEEN A GENERAL
INFLATION OF THE PRICE OF GOODS USED IN THE
CHILD'S CARE; AND THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS
NOW EMPLOYED AND EARNING AN ADEQUATE
WAGE TO ENABLE HIM TO PAY AN INCREASED
SUPPORT ALLOWANCE.
Appellant claims much forth~ testimony as to therespondent's earning power. The trial court chose to ignore
this, ruling that it was irrelevant; that the duty to support
the child rests on the husband. No evidence was offered
to show that this duty had been lifted, nor that appellant
was unable to pay the increased amount sought.
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This court has indicated that a wife's earnings may
not be considered in determining the amount of support
money to be paid by a husband. In the case of Holbrook
vs. Holbrook, 208 P. (2d) 1113, a decree of divorce was
entered on May 11, 1948 awarding the plaintiff wife the
custody of 4 minor children of the parties and directing the
defendant to pay her $150.00 per month for the support of
these four children. A cash settlement of approximately
$10,000.00 was allowed the plaintiff for the purpose of
purchasing a new home. She also was given a certain other
cash and assets, but no alimony.
On January 11, 1949 an Order to Show Cause was
issued against Mr. Holbrook, and at this time he filed a
petition for modification of decree. The testimony showed,
among other things not pertinent to our question, that since
the decree Mrs. Holbrook had acquired work which paid her
approximately $175.00 per month. Upon the basis of this,
the defendant founded his contention that circumstances
had changed entitling him to a modification of the decree
to $80.00 per month for the support of the children.
The lower court stated it would not consider this fact
and that it would limit its decision to a change in status
of the defendant or of the children. The Supreme Court,
affirming the lower court, stated as follows: (We quote
from Page 1115 of 208 Pacific Second.)
"We see nothing in these facts that would justify the court modifying the allotments to the four
children. The $150.00 was for their support, not the
support of the mother. Naturally the mother would
have to support herself. This she proceeded to do.
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It would seem strange to permit the husband and

father to force her into such a situation, then to take
advantage of it to escape his liabilities without showing some change for the worse in his ability to meet
his obligations."
Appellant claims the proof fails to show a change in
his ability to pay, or that he can pay the increase at all.
However, Finding of Fact number 11, states that at the
time the divorce was granted (April 16, 1945) defendant
was unemployed. This was alleged in paragraph 11 of the
Complaint. Defendant entered a voluntary appearance,
waiver and consent in this matter. We submit that he can
not now come in and say that he was employed at the time
of the decree, for the matter is res judicata. We quote from
30 A. J. (Judgments) Sec. 178 :
"It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence
that material facts or questions which were in issue
in a former action, and were there admitted or
judicially determined, are conclusively settled by a
judgment rendered therein, and that such facts or
questions become res judicata and may not again
be litigated in a subsequent action between the
parties."

This principle is announced and supported in Smith vs.
Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 P. 653, (at pages 131, 132, and 133
of 37 Utah).
In 17 A. J. (Divorce and Separation) § 486, it is stated:
"As between the parties to the proceedings a
valid judgment or decree is conclusive of all charges
set forth and of facts found, or which might have
been found, and of defenses raised at the trial."
(Citing cases.)
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Appellant claims that he earned about $1700.00 during
the period from January 1, 1949 to August 25, 1949 (Tr.
78.) In his brief he contends this shows a decreased ability
to pay. However, on cross examination, during which time
he was shown respondent's Exhibit "A", (Appellant's checking account record) he admitted that he deposited all deposits shown during the 7.8 month period in question, except $800.00 (Tr. 81, 82) which he claimed was deposited
there by his twenty-one year old son. He further admitted
that the deposits he m~de all came from his earnings (Tr.
83).
Exhibit "A" shows the following deposits:
Jan. 19,
Mar. 1,
Mar. 2,
Mar. 8,
Mar. 22,
Apr. 1,
Apr. 22,
May 23,
June 3,
Aug. 2,

1949 ... __ . ___ .... __ ..... $1,000.00
1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500.00
1949. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300.00
1949....
100.00
1949. . . . . . .
150.00
1949. .
175.00
1949.
100.00
1949 . . . . . . . . .
150.00
1949 .
........
363.30
150.00
1949. . . . . . . . . .
Total .......... .

. .... $2,988.30

Even if appellant did not earn the $800.00 he claims
his 21 year old son deposited in his account, he still has
earned an average of $283.00 a month for the 7.8 month
period in question. This shows his statement of earnings
of "about $1700.00" for this period was untrue.
After hearing this falsity the trial court would have
been warranted in concluding that appellant was not telling

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
the truth about the $800.00, since the exhibit shows that
the account may be drawn on only by his wife and him,
and since he testified that they made all of the withdrawals
themselves (Tr. 83). In any event the money was received
and spent by appellant. With this added, his monthly income averaged approximately $380.00 per month. The
trial court considered this adequate for the increase, since
no showing was made that it was inadequate.
The testimony further shows that appellant's elder
son has now attained his majority (Tr. 82) and so the
appellant is thus relieved of the responsibility of supporting him. It also shows that his home is now paid for (Tr.
85), although it was not at the time of the divorce decree
(Tr. 86).
Appellant offered absolutely no testimony which
would indicate inability to pay the increase requested. This
would seem to imply that his earnings are adequate for
that purpose. Since May 28, 1948, no withdrawals were
made from his savings account (Tr. 10). ·
Thus we see that appellant, who was unemployed April
16, 1945, is now employed, earning $283.00-$380.00 per
month, now has his house paid for, and is no longer responsible for the support of his other son.
As to plaintiff-respondent's situation:
The record shows she spent about $25.00 a month for
the support of the minor child of the parties at the time
the decree was granted (Tr. 17, 40). The court found that
defendant could pay $25.00 a month (Finding of Fact
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Number 11, in the original divorce action) for the support
of the child and awarded that amount.
Plaintiff now finds it necessary to spend an average of
approximately $86.74 a month for the care of the child (Tr.
21 through 27). There are two apparent causes of this.
First, the child has grown from 15 months-still a babe in
arms (Tr. 14, 16)-to five years, eight months at the time
of the trial court's decision herein, in consequence of which
he is much larger, more active and is about to enter school.
Secondly, there has been a general inflation in the cost of
the items necessary for the child. Both Mr. Taylor (Tr. 44,
45, 46) and Mr. Pace (Tr. 57 through 65) supported this.
The court is entitled to look beyond the evidence offered
to show this inflation. The court may take judicial knowledge of economic and social conditions, National Bank of
the Republic vs. Beckstead, 68 Utah 421, 250 P. 1033, and
matters of common knowledge, Little Cottonwood Water Co.
vs. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116.
Furthermore, under the provisions of Section 104-46-1,
U. C. A. 1943:
"In all these cases the court may resort for its
aid to appropriate books or documents of reference."
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a substantial inflation occurred during the period in question.
Appellant criticizes witness Taylor's testimony since he
could not correlate the differences in cost of clothing for a
15 month old child in 1945 as against a 5 year old child in
1949. Such correlation is unnecessary. Where we know
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that the cost of supporting the child has increased from two
causes, i. e. because he now wears trousers instead of
diapers, and the trousers now cost more than diapers and
also more than trousers did in 1945, it is not necessary to
decide how much of the additional cost was due to each
factor since the total change in cost of caring for the child
gives us the measure and the changes in circumstance
furnish the reason.
As far as the effect of the inflation on appellant's own
financial condition, this makes no difference as long as appellant has adequate funds to support the child.

3. FINDING OF FACT NO. 3 WAS SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE, FOR THE OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT THE CHILD RESTED UPON THE APPELLANT,
AND ANY EVIDENCE TENDING TO SHOW THE RESPONDENT'S INCOME WAS IRRELEVANT AND
COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT; AND
THE TESTIMONY WAS CLEAR THAT NO FUND HAD
BEEN SET UP BY THE DEFENDANT TO PROVIDE
FOR THE CHILD'S CARE NOR HAD ANY OTHER
FUNDS BEEN PROVIDED ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT FOR THE CARE OF THE CHILD.
Appellant's objection to Finding of Fact number 3
arises from a misconception of the law, which is clearly
stated in the Holbrook case (supra, page 11). If the appellant had set up a trust fund, an annuity, or by some other
means provided for support for the child in addition to
what the decree directed him to pay, that would constitute
other "funds with which to support the child," and the
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husband would be entitled to credit therefore. But as long
as the support of the child remains the responsibility of the
father, and he is able to support the child, he is not entitled to credit for the mother's efforts. (Holbrook case,
Supra, page 11.)

....,.

4. THE TESTIMONY SHOWS THAT THE APPELLANT'S INCOME WAS AMPLE FOR THE PAYMENT
OF THE INCREASED ALLOWANCE, AND THERE
WAS NO TESTIMONY WHICH IN ANY WAY CONTROVERTED THIS; THEREFORE, FINDING OF FACT
NO. 4-A WAS CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The original divorce decree was based on a finding that
defendant-appellant was unemployed on April 16, 1945.
He now tries to add additional meaning to that finding.
This can not be done. The question is res judicata. (See discussion starting at page 12 above.)
Nor can the fact that as an independent contractor he
occasionally has some free time .be said as a matter of law
to show that he is not "employed" now, since from the proof
the court was entitled to infer that his average monthly
earnings for the 7.8 month period prior to the trial were
from $283.00 to $380.00 per month. This was not only a
substantial income, but defendant made no effort to show
that the cost of supporting himself and his wife was such
that he would be in any way inconvenienced if required to
pay the increased support money allowance.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
5. THE TESTIMONY CLEARLY WARRANTED
THE COURT'S GRANTING TO THE RESPONDENT AN
ADDITIONAL AWARD TO COVER, THE COSTS FOR
THE MINOR CHILD DURING THE EDUCATIONAL
PERIOD.
There is ample proof in the record to support an order
of the Court raising the allowance to $50.00 a month without
regard to the boy's entrance in school. The trial Court
chose not to do this, but placed it at $35.00 a month till he
started school. It would seem that the respondent, not the
appellant, should be entitled to complain of this. However,
we feel that the Court has judicial knowledge that after
children start school they require more and better clothing,
and we have not complained of this. If the appellant's
argument on this point is recognized, we feel the order
should be modified to allow respondent $50.00 per month
from the date of the modification order rather than from
the date of commencing school.
6. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
FINDING OF FACT NO. 4-C TO THE EFFECT THAT
THE COST OF FOOD, EDUCATION AND CARE FOR
THE CHILD HAD INCREASED.
The record shows that respondent spent on the child
before the original decree about $25.00 a month. She detailed the present expenses fully (Tr. 21 through 27) and
they average about $86.7 4 per month. They indicate that
the various items for which expenditures must be made
have increased in number and that the cost of the individual
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items necessary has increased (Supra page 3). There is no
testimony that the grandmother pays for the child's clothing,
medical care, toys, or does more than provide food and tend
the child. Furthermore, this $30 item alone is more than
the allowance originally made the respondent, and more
than respondent expended for the care of the child before
the original decree.

'

'

7. THE FINDING OF FACT NO. 5 INDICATING
THE AMOUNTS NECESSARY FOR THE APPROPRIATE CARE OF THE CHILD UNTIL AND AFTER IT
ENTERS SCHOOL IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE AND IS A PROPER FINDING OF FACT
BASED UPON THAT EVIDENCE.

-

•I:~ •

::::.
:~
::

:j;

:~:

if;

Appellant contends he lacks the means to pay the increase. He analyzes (p. 18 Appellant's Brief) his income
as amounting to only $212.50 per month. We have shown
it is from $283.00 to $380.00 per month. Furthermore, no
evidence was offered to show that his expenses were such
as would make it at all difficult for him to pay the increase.
Appellant also claims that the mother in this case
should bear some of the responsibility for supporting the
child, ch~.iming that the appellant is an "over-burdened
father." There is no evidence of any such over burden on
the appellant as would invoke any such principle, and certainly the respondent will be bearing a good share of the
cost any way. While appellant would be paying $35.00,
respondent would be paying $51.74 a month and when appellant is paying $50.00, respondent will be paying $36.74 a
month.
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8. IT WAS PROPER FOR THE COURT TO GRANT
RESPONDENT JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT FOR THE SUM OF $100.00 FOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR ANY ATTORNEY FEE IN THIS ACTION,
EVEN THOUGH APPELLANT WAS NOT DELINQUENT IN HIS PAYMENTS AT THE TIME OF THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION.
This question is thoroughly dealt with in the Honorable
Trial Judge's opinion. The appellant relies heavily on the
Iowa cases, since the Iowa Statute is similar to Sec. 40-3-3,
U. C. A., 1943. However, the Iowa Court has at ,all times
refused to make any allowance of attorney fees after the
decree becomes final, so it holds directly contrary to the
rule announced by this court in the many adjudicated cases,
where at the time modification was sought, the husband was
delinquent in the payment of his support money.
In Barish vs. Barish, 180 N. W. 724, decided by the
Iowa Supreme Court in 1920, the Court states:
"We hold that neither this nor any other statute
gives this appellant any better claim to the taxation
of an attorney fee than is given any litigant who
seeks to make a money recovery without having a
contract for the taxing of attorney fees."
The court states with reference to his wife that "she
is no longer the wife of the appellee."
In Stone vs. Stone, 212 Ia. 1344, 235 N. W. 492, the
husband sought the modification and the wife resisted it
and it was denied and the Iowa Court held up even in this
case the wife was not entitled to an attorney fee.
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As is pointed out by the trial judge's memorandum,
the \Vashington cases cited by the appellant are not in point
inasmuch as the \Vashington statute provides for the taxing
of attorney fees only "pending the action for divorce."
Washington has no such statute as our 40-3-5.
In the Wisconsin case of Blake vs. Blake, 35 N. W. 551,
there is no showing that defendant's husband was in arrears
at the time the decree of modification was sought and yet the
\Visconsin Supreme Court allowed an attorney fee to the
wife.
In Chambers vs. Chambers, 106 N. W. 993, the'
Nebraska Supreme Court on similar facts, allowed an attorney fee to the wife.
Counsel for respondent has been unable to find any
case which draws a distinction in allowing an attorney fee
to the wife in an action for modification between the situation where the h~sband is delinquent and where he is not
delinquent. The learned Trial Judge in his memorandum
points out that when the circumstances indicate that the
support money allowance is no longer adequate, the mother
is well justified in bringing an action and since this is done
for the benefit of the child whose support is the responsibility of the husband, then the husband, not the wife, should
pay the attorney fees.
The trial judge further points out that in cases like
this, the husband has not been making an adequate provision for the support of the child and this action is brought
to require that he make adequate provision. It would seem
logical that it would be just as reasonable to require the
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husband to pay the attorney fee where his failure to make
adequate provision is due to the inadequacy of the support
money allowance as where it is due to his failure to keep
up the payments required by the court order.
We further respectfully submit, that the award of the
attorney fee is not made as a punishment in any of the Utah
cases dealing with this situation. Rather, a change of circumstances has arisen creating a situation requiring further
legal proceding in the divorce matter. The court has retained jurisdiction of this matter under our statutes, and
the change is made for the benefit of the child. Therefore,
the fee, it would seem, is awarded for the benefit of the
child.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits, that the pleadings and
the proof were entirely adequate to support the Findings,
Conclusions and Modification Order of the District Court.
There is ample evidence of a need for the increase and ample
evidence of the appellant's ability to pay it, but no evidence
to show that it would work any hardship upon him.
Furthermore, respondent contends that the Trial Court
was justified under the law of this State in ordering the appellant to pay to the respondent her attorney fee.
It is therefore respectfully submitted, that both on the
facts and the law, the judgment of the lower court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN M. HATCH,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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